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Images as Arguments in Visual Studies 
 
The text presented here is part of the introduction to a book I have edited called 
Theorizing Visual studies. It is being written entirely by graduate students around the 
world. The book will be published in 2013, by Routledge (New York and London). 
The book has two purposes. First, it is an attempt to produce an anthology, or 
textbook, for the study of the visual, which is not written by middle-aged professors 
(like me!) but reflects the interests of the current generation of scholars. Second, it is 
intended to interrogate the role of the visual in visual studies, art history, 
Bildwissenschaft, iconology, and related fields. Increasingly, visual studies has 
become a theory-driven enterprise in which images provide only an illustrative 
function: they illustrate theories that are often taken from philosophic sources. In this 
book, every image has to do more than just illustrate points made in the text. This 
excerpt sets out my ideas about how that can be done. 
 
One of our principal starting points is the claim that in several specific respects visual 
studies is not yet a visual discipline. Visual studies has been around for about twenty 
years, depending on who writes its history. It is represented in about a dozen journals 
(again, depending on how they are counted), and has produced several hundred books, 
at least ten introductory studies, and at least five anthologies or readers like this one. 
Yet despite its growing complexity and rhetorical sophistication, visual studies 
remains a heavily theorized, text-driven field. To some degree that is the normal 
condition of any field in the humanities, including art history, but visual studies has 
always had the special brief of extended engagement with the visual world, and so its 
wordiness is significant: the difficulty is in saying what that significance is, and how 
far its effects reach. There are at least three senses in which it could be said that visual 
studies is not yet a visual enterprise. 
 
First, most of what is in any given book or article is text, and there are some texts that 
have virtually no illustrations. This book is no exception in that regard: in this book, 
too, the pages devoted to text outnumber the pages given to images. 
 
Second, visual studies analyses often tend to use images as examples, illustrations, or 
reminders of concepts developed in the accompanying texts. Thus images of the Twin 
Towers, of Dolly the cloned sheep, of the New Yorker cover cartoon depicting Barack 
Obama as a terrorist, and many others are reproduced as reminders. Their detailed 
content—their visual content—is not often at issue. Images are used as examples of 
political, gender, and other issues—examples, as Wittgenstein would have said, of 
things that they are not. 
 
Third, one of the tropes of visual studies is a promise to let images set the terms of the 
discussion, so that they generate and determine the reader's and viewer's interests and 
arguments. That promise is a trope because it is commonly made, but seldom 
practiced. Tom Mitchell, for example, has argued that pictures produce theory just as 
texts do, and that there should be a reciprocal attention to pictures in theory and 
pictures as theory. He calls this "picture theory." Susan Buck-Morss has written on 
several occasions about the way she takes images as starting points, and how her 
arguments develop around images. But we feel that despite these efforts, images 
remain overwhelmingly marginal and even dispensable, and there are still no texts in 
which images take on the work of argument. A sign of the imbalance is that points 
that are made by art historians and visual theorists about gender, subjectivity, political 
identity, and many other subjects, could sometimes be made just as well without 
images. To address this condition, we attempt two things in this book: first, a critical 
revaluation of some values that have led to the current relation between textual and 
visual material; and second, a rethinking of the places of the visual. 
 
1 Visual studies as argument 
 
This book is intended as an introduction to the subject, and so it includes some of the 
essential figures—Lacan, Benjamin, Foucault, Barthes—and some of the 
irreplaceable concepts—the frame, the gaze, the spectator, the operator. But we have 
also tried to cut into the assumptions of the field by proposing new concepts—
collapsing, surfacing, perforating, invisibility. We both present the field's history and 
argue with it, rehearse the canonical texts and criticize them. Some of this conceptual 
work is done in the longer introductions to the book's Nodes and Perforations (these 
are explained in "How to Use This Book"), but most takes place in the brief 
introductions to the hundred Topics that comprise most of the book. The introductions 
to the hundred Topics are intended to do three things: 
 
First, they frame the material, setting out the basic arguments and justifying the 
particular texts and images we have chosen. 
 
Second, the introductions also provide the elements of a history of reception 
(Rezeptionsgeschichte) for each concept, visual image, or text. As visual studies 
develops, it becomes more aware of its history. It begins to matter that Walter 
Benjamin's work was translated into English relatively late, that Manon Souriau was 
"rediscovered," that the "revival" of Aby Warburg has several phases, each with its 
own history. Texts like Foucault's and Lacan's are no longer just tools, but historical 
episodes that bring with them specific and often contested moments in the history of 
visual studies and other disciplines in different parts of the world. The introductions 
explore selected moments in the pertinent secondary literature, so that readers who are 
new to the material can begin to find their way into the critical reception of the work. 
 
And third, the introductions also argue: if we find that an author or artist has been 
misread, or that a passage or work has been overlooked, we make the case in the 
introductions. Hence some introductions are interventions in the reception history. 
The combination of historical scholarship and arguments with history has several 
precedents in art history, most notably Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois's 
Formless: A User's Guide (English ed., 1997) which reports on Georges Bataille's 
"Dictionary," but also expands it in directions the authors acknowledge Bataille 
would not have done. The purpose of that combination of historical and critical work 
was to produce something that could be "useful" for art production and criticism at 
the moment the exhibition and book were produced. This book has a similar motive 
for combining history with argument: our purpose is not to enliven historical 
scholarship, and not only to demonstrate that the past has living connection to the 
present. Instead we are interested in producing a text that can help produce other 
texts, other images. 
 
2 The visual as argument 
 
In this book we attempt—we think for the first time—to explore what might happen 
when the visual is allowed the same discursive, rhetorical, and philosophic space as 
the linguistic. We try to do this in several ways. First there are three negative 
guidelines—things we have tried to avoid: 
 
- No images in this book simply illustrate the surrounding argument. An excerpt from 
Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project, for example, will not be illustrated by 
photographs of nineteenth-century Parisian arcades; an excerpt on Foucault's 
discussion of surveillance will not be illustrated with a print of Bentham's Panopticon 
prison. 
 
- No images in this book exemplify the framing argument, showing how a given 
theory works in visual art. An argument about political activism in relation to 
business, for instance, will not be illustrated by a video still of a performance by the 
Yes Men; an argument about intervention in the art world will not be illustrated with a 
poster by the Guerrilla Girls. 
 
- No image in this book will primarily function as a mnemonic. In art history, one of 
the principal purposes of illustrations is to remind readers of artworks that they have, 
ideally, encountered in the original. For that purpose, the reproductions need not be of 
good quality. University presses in particular have adopted laser printing technologies 
and uncoated paper stock, so that the average greyscale range in contemporary first-
world academic publishing is lower than it was at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. High quality illustrations are associated with the art market, where 
connoisseurship and formal values matter in a way that they do not in academic 
discourse. The low reprodution quality of academic presses is not an issue if the 
purpose of the illustration is to remind readers of absent artworks or to reassure 
readers that the author and publisher are not aiming at the commercial art market. But 
if the internal structure or details of the image are part of the accompanying analysis, 
high quality is important. 
 
To complement these negative guidelines, we develop several models of the visual as 
argument: 
 
1. Images as intelligent theories. Some images in this book are intended as 
intelligent commentary on other images and theories. This idea comes from the art 
historian Leo Steinberg's discussion of Leonardo's Last Supper, which surveys 
engravings, paintings, and other copies of Leonardo's painting and takes them as 
"intelligent" responses, on a par with critical and historical evaluations. (Steinberg, 
Leonardo's Incessant Last Supper.) 
 
An image that provides a commentary on a text, and is therefore an intelligent theory 
in its own right, can be understood in two senses. The image be presented as an 
insight into a text or image that inspired it, or it can be presented as a further 
development of that image or text. Steinberg is only interested in the former 
possibility. The copies of the Last Supper that he reproduces are used as ways of 
deepening our understanding of Leonardo's painting. But it is also possible to take the 
copies Steinberg presents as further developments of ideas that began in the Last 
Supper, and therefore of interest in their own right. In the latter case, images can be 
participants in an ongoing development of theory or argument. In Steinberg's book, 
none of the copies are said to be anywhere near the level of the original painting, but 
in this book, images can often be considered as having equal or greater interest than 
the texts or images to which they respond. In that case, it is the images themselves 
that are of interest as developments of ideas apparently originated in earlier texts or 
images. Steinberg's book is illustrated with a billboard of the Last Supper, which he 
encountered off a highway in New Jersey. The approach we take here would be open 
to the possibility that the billboard is a development of the Last Supper that is 
potentially of greater theoretical intelligence—greater interest, cogency, 
persuasiveness, truth—than the original. 
 
2. Images as mistaken theories. Some images in this book are presented as 
simplifications or misreadings of theories. The idea that an image might be mistaken 
is outside Steinberg's working method: in his account, there is no way to know when a 
given copy of the Last Supper is not "intelligent"—and for the same reason, there is 
no way to tell when an image misunderstands its model. But if images are arguments, 
then some of them will be mistaken, simpleminded, wrongheaded, or otherwise 
unhelpful. (Others will be strong misreadings, and therefore "intelligent" from 
Steinberg's perspective.) 
 
The same two possibilities apply here as in the case of "intelligent" images. An image 
that exemplifies a mistaken reading of a theoretical position can be presented as a way 
of understanding problems inherent in the original theoretical position, but such an 
image can also be understood as simplified or mistaken interpretation of the 
theoretical position. In the first case, the image is presented as a way of criticizing the 
original theory, text, or image on which it depended. The equivalent in Steinberg's 
book would be a copy that reveals a weakness in the original Last Supper. In the 
second case, the weakness or mistakes in the image are presented as the faults of the 
person who made the image. The equivalent in Steinberg's book would be a copy that 
misunderstands the Last Supper, for example by missing its theological symbolism. A 
contemporary example might be the myriad contemporary photographs of everyday 
life, from Beat Strueli to commercial companies such as Corbis that offer stock 
images of everyday life for advertisers to use as backgrounds. Such images can be 
understood as simplifications or misreadings of theories of the everyday articulated by 
writers such as Michel du Certeau. In the first possibility, the contemporary 
photographs would be evidence of weaknesses in du Certeau's position (that it allows 
itself to be co-opted for capitalist and ostensibly fine art purposes). In the second 
possibility, photographers such as Streuli necessarily misread writers such as du 
Certeau for their notions of the everyday. 
 
3. Images as interruptions. Some images make theories more complex by changing 
the subject, interpolating unexpected examples, conjuring ideas, or juxtaposing 
apparently irrelevant places, people, shapes, colors, or other visual incident with 
theories that are apparently unrelated. Some justification for this position can be 
found in Jean-François Lyotard's Discours, figure (1974) but in a less philosophic 
sense images are often interuptions: it is a common experience to be momentarily 
distracted from some train of thought by an image that is presented as pertinent. That 
kind of interruption is fundamental to the functioning of advertising. For example a 
billboard by Benetton showing child workers in a brickyard could be taken as a 
shocking advertising ploy, juxtaposing child labor with fashion, and that kind of 
observation was a starting point for visual studies analyses of the Bendetton 
campaigns. But the advertisement also brings in images of battered red bricks, which 
nominally contribute both to the theme of child labor and the theme of fashion, but 
also provide a strange distraction, a mass of visual incident and an influx of 
apparently unrelated visual precedents and associations, which can have a 
measurable, but unpredictable, effect on conversations about the image and its 
interpretation. This capacity of adding apparently unrelated visual incident to well-
known messages and meanings can be construed as a fundamental property of the 
visual. In this book images are sometimes presented as interruptions in otherwise 
more continuous conversations or discourses, and the challenge is to understand the 
interruption as both relevant to further analysis, and also as an inescapable, inherent 
property of the visual, which—as Lyotard owuld say—can never not be an 
interruption. 
 
4. Images as things that remind us of argument. These first three points amount to 
claiming that images can contain, embody, suggest, or propose arguments in various 
forms. All three positions assume that specifically propositional thought can be 
extracted from images. When images are said to theorize, or to reciprocally influence 
theory, as in Tom Mitchell's "picture theory," propositional thought is what is at stake. 
We recognize the appearance of visual argument as a particular mode of a more 
general response, in which visual images elicit the feeling of legibility—the sense that 
they might make sense, without a clear articulation of what that sense might be. The 
attempt to understand images as objects structured like language or writing is usually 
exemplified by Roland Barthes's structuralism. Barthes wrote, for example, about 
diagrams in Diderot's Encyclopédie ("The Plates of the Encyclopedia, Eng. trans. 
1986). In Culture of Diagram, Michael Marrinan and John Bender note that Barthes 
uses terms like paradigmatic and syntagmatic to describe objects like pots and pans 
depicted in a plate of the Encyclopédie, and in doing so, he "effaces their problematic 
visual fissures"—their apparent weighlessness, the shadows they fail to cast, all sorts 
of odd things about them. Even though we know images aren't writing, the feeling 
persists. This more general field is poorly theorized and tremendously varied. There 
are claims that images are "pensive" (this was explored, for example, by Hanneke 
Grootenboer, in a pedagogic program called "The Pensive Image"), that they work in 
society as if we imputed agency to them (Mitchell's question, "What do pictures 
want?" asks about this possibility), that they entrance us because they conjure time, 
loss, or memory, without necessarily doing so in an articulated manner (this appears, 
for example, in Louis Marin's To Destroy Painting, English ed. 1995). Many related 
ideas have been developed over the last hundred years. These strands converge on the 
idea that images can elicit a feeling of reading,sense, logic, or legibility, and that 
property sets in motion a range of claims about the relation between visual images, 
language, and logic.  
 
In this book we take an opportunistic or pragmatic approach to these theories, using 
them to justify taking images as originators of thought, and not just reflections of it. 
Some images in this book modify theories without actually providing any new 
propositional content. They put us in mind of arguments, reading, sense, meanings, 
claims, propositions, and logic, but they do not clearly contribute those things. 
Contributors to this book sometimes take images as things that are reminiscent of 
argument, but actually provide something more complex and difficult to articulate. 
 
5. Images as things that slow argument. When images are used in certain ways, 
they can slow the sometimes vertiginous speed of analysis, and provide intervals of 
relatively sparse argument. The images of the Iraq war conjured by Nicholas Mirzoeff 
in the book Babylon are an example. Babylon is sparsely illustrated, partly because 
the images that interest Mirzoeff have such wide currency. (They are photographs 
disseminated by the military.) Such images work in a very direct way in Mirzoeff's 
argument, as instances of "weaponized" visual material that is entirely packaged and 
delivered by the military. But as individual images—even if they had been shown in 
Mirzoeff's book in greater numbers, and at higher resolution and better print quality—
they do not speak about their weaponization. Instead they conjure such ideas without 
expressing them. Their muteness, their vagueness (some are taken in classified 
locations, and there is often limited information about the circumstances in which 
they were made), the very uniform and general way they can be taken to be 
"weaponized" by the military-industrial complex, all work to slow the argument 
Mirzoeff pursues, the way a sea anchor weights down and slows a large ship. Looking 
at length at specific images of the war, as Charles Green and Lindell Brown have 
done in the case of Australian military in Iraq, produces an entirely different effect: 
their paintings, done after photographs they took while embedded with Australian 
troops, elicit specific arguments about the war. The images disseminated by the 
military diffuse, slow, weaken, and potentially undermine arguments about their 
weaponization simply by being non-propositional. In this book some images appear 
as sumps of logical, propositional thought: places where thought slows, and argument 
pauses. 
 
These five positions and their three counter-positions amount to a theory of the place 
of images in critical thought. This book is intended as an answer to the text-driven, 
text-centered corpus of visual studies, and as an accumulation of instances of what we 
are calling visual argument. 
 
It may seem that this list of four positions omits one that is crucial to any account of 
how images create meaning: the claim that images alone can comprise an argument. 
We are skeptical about this. Buck-Morss has said that Dreamworld and Catastrophe 
(2000) began with images, which had their own argument, and similar things have 
been claimed, implicity, by many books that avoid texts. In twentieth-century art 
history there is Horst Janson's nearly textless Key Monuments of the History of Art 
(1959), a pedagogic tool that is nevertheless intended to embody a standard Western 
narrative of art history. Outside of art history there is also André Malraux's Musée 
Imaginaire (1947-1950), with its mixture of surrealist and historicist examples 
intended to produce a meaningful experience. In more recent history there are 
wordless graphic novels, from the Weimar Republic to artists such as Chris Ware and 
Yuichi Yokoyama. In the West the tradition of wordless books is centuries-old, and 
includes such eccentric examples as the early eighteenth-century Mutus Liber (ed. 
Jean Laplace, 1979), a deliberately obscure set of pictorial instructions for alchemical 
operations. In this long and heterogeneous history there are few examples of sets of 
images that can be read as possessing clear arguments aside from conventional 
narratives. The claim that the arguments in a book began as collections of images is 
plausible and common (it is made implicitly in Benjamin's Arcades Project and 
explicitly by Buck-Morss), but the claim that images can stand in place of arguments 
remains problematic. In this book we address this by including some images as Image 
Boxes, on the model of the usual Text Boxes: this is to signal that the images are 
intended to raise this question without, perhaps, offering any definitive answer. For 
more on this see "How to Use This Book." 
 
A textbook may not be the best place to introduce new concepts, turn history to the 
purpose of immediate use, pursue arguments with the field, or experiment with the 
place of the visual in visual studies. Those could all be considered prerogatives of 
advanced texts or experimental monographs aimed only at graduates or colleagues. 
But visual studies continues to be diverse and even fragmented, uncertain about its 
relevant history, mobile in its methods, and experimental in its subjects of study. We 
feel it is not time for the kind of anthology or reader that presents the field's history 
and sets out its methods. In this labile atmosphere, even the few texts that have 
become canonical (Foucault, Benjamin) call out for invested, critical readings. We 
hope this book recreates the flux of the field. 
